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Justice McCaleb took the position that the judgments and sen-
tences were null and stated that the majority should not have
equated the state's motion with the motion for new trial or the
motion in arrest of judgment, as the purpose of the state's mo-
tion was to have the null judgments set aside. If an unresponsive
verdict is treated as a nullity, then the lapse of procedural delays
should not cause such nullities to achieve validity. This latter
position was taken in the dissenting opinion of Justice Hamlin.
Finally, four of the Justices felt that at least the sentences were
invalid.'4 Article 527 would appear to indicate that no invalid
sentence should be allowed to stand. In view of the result of the
case, perhaps the fact that there was an agreement between the
state and the defendant, and, by virtue of its own error, the state
sought abrogation was of greater significance and consequence
than is indicated by the single reference to these facts made in
a concurring opinion.' 5
Bernard E. Boudreaux, Jr.
ELECTIONS - SECRECY OF THE BALLOT
Plaintiff alleged that secrecy of the ballot was violated at two
precincts having 895 of the 20,061 legal votes cast during the
1960 Democratic Primary Election for the office of Judge of the
Twenty-first Judicial District. If the vote in these two contested
precincts were set aside, petitioner would have had a majority
of one vote. In both precincts the voting machines were located
in buildings near stairways leading to the second floors. The
booths were constructed with open tops permitting someone on
the stairway to see into the booth, but the testimony was some-
what contradictory concerning the extent the interior could be
seen. At both precincts persons were seen on the stairway at
various times during the election. Plaintiff sought to have spe-
14. Chief Justice Fournet stated that the sentences were invalid but that the
state's remedy had prescribed. Justice Hawthorne stated that as a matter of law
the sentences should be set aside, but held otherwise as a matter of equity. Justices
McCaleb and Hamlin dissented as to the result of the case.
15. See in Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1959-1960 Term -
Criminal Law and Procedure, 21 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 366, 375 (1961), a dis-
cussion of the possibility of the state being estopped from alleging invalidity of
judgments and sentences because of its own error. On the matter of the binding
effect of agreements between prosecuting attorneys and defendants, see State v.
Lopez, 19 Mo. 254 (1853) ; State v. Ward, 112 W.Va. 552, 165 S.E. 803 (1932) ;
Annot., 85 A.L.R. 1177 (1932); 1 WHARTON, CaIMINAL LAW AND PaoCEnURE
§ 140 (1957) ; 5 id. § 2210.
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cific votes voided so that she would be declared the winner. In
the alternative she contended that because of an overall pattern
of irregularities the election should be annulled and a new one
held. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. On
appeal to the cotrt of appeal, held, affirmed, per curiam. Votes
will not be voided which are cast under conditions which permit
nothing more than occasional surveillance, and neither will the
election be annulled. Burch v. McClendon, 123 So.2d 640 (La.
App. 1960).
For purposes of analysis it is convenient to distinguish those
cases in which the court determines certain contested votes are
void from those in which the whole election is declared invalid.
In the former cases the court is in effect participating in the
running of the election by redetermining the validity of votes,
since a body of election officials charged with supervising the
election and ruling on the validity of votes has already deter-
mined this identical question.1 When faced with this type of
election contest the courts have required a clear showing by com-
petent evidence that the contested votes were improperly counted
or improperly voided before altering the findings of the election
officials. 2 In resolving this type of situation at least three the-
ories have been evolved by the courts. One theory is that in the
absence of fraud,8 violation of secrecy by voters or election offi-
cials will not necessarily nullify the affected votes.4 Another is
that secrecy is a personal privilege which may be waived by the
individual voter.5 Still another is that violation of secrecy by
either the elector or the election official will cause the vote to be
voided.6 No matter which theory the courts follow, there is a
1. LA. R.S. 18:343, 541-721 (1950).
2. Wright v. Heflin, 155 La. 765, 99 So. 592 (1924) ; Womack v. Nettles, 155
La. 359, 99 So. 290 (1924) ; Reeves v. Dean, 138 La. 889, 70 So. 871 (1916);
Andrews v. Blackman, 131 La. 355, 59 So. 769 (1912) ; Madere v. Sellers, 120 La.
812, 45 So. 735 (1908).
3. The term "fraud" as used in election cases generally refers to misconduct
designed to influence unduly electors in the casting of their votes or to the actual
stealing of votes. Crooks v. Chevallier, 156 So. 586 (La. App. 1934).
4. In a case where election officials assisted electors with their 'ballot without
first obtaining the required oath, and in a case where voting booths were not pro-
vided, the court held that in the absence of fraud, the voter would not be deprived
of the effect of his ballot. State ex rel. Wahl v. Speer, 284 Mo. 45, 223 S.W. 655
(1920) ; Hope v. Flentge, 140 Mo. 390, 41 S.W. 1002 (1897).
5. Florida holds that the constitutional provisions for a secret ballot guarantee
a personal privilege which may be waived by voter. McDonald v. Miller, 90 So.2d
124 (Fla. 1956) ; State e.T rel. Hutchins v. Tucker, 106 Fla. 905, 143 So. 754
(1932).
6. The primary purpose and object of the secret ballot system is to insure the
independence of the elector. The violation of mandatory statutes designed to pro-
vide this secrecy by either officials or electors will cause the vote to be voided.
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strong presumption that the finding of the election officials as to
the validity of the votes is correct. 7 When the court determines
the validity of certain votes, the election results are modified
in accordance with this decision and the necessity for another
election is thus avoided.
A different situation exists in the second category where the
contestant seeks to have the entire election annulled.8 Here the
plaintiff is attacking the presumption that the entire election
was conducted with regularity sufficient to express the free will
of the majority. It would seem that courts are particularly
adapted to determining the overall legality of an election by de-
termining if the election was conducted in substantial compli-
ance with the law. The court is not so much running the election
or redetermining validity of votes as it is performing the judicial
function of preserving from abuse the rights of electors. In
weighing the consequences of such irregularities in conducting
an election, the court must consider their effect in the light of
the essential object, that of insuring an election which manifests
the will of the majority of those who voted. Therefore, in each
case the court must determine if the irregularity is of sufficient
magnitude to require invalidation of the entire election. For
example, if the absence of voting booths is proved, it may not
establish that secrecy was violated,9 but in Louisiana it is a de-
viation from the provisions of the law.10 Other provisions of the
Nelson v. Bullard, 155 Minn. 419, 194 N.W. 308 (1923) ; Board v. Dill, 26 Okla.
104, 110 Pac. 1107 (1910).
7. There exists a prima facie presumption of the regularity and correctness
of a judicial district Democratic Executive Committee's official action in promul-
gating primary election returns and certifying a nominee for office. Lafargue v.
Galloway, 184 La. 707, 167 So. 197 (1936). A similar presumption exists in otherjurisdictions. See McDonald v. Miller, 90 So.2d 124 (Fla. 1956) ; State v. Speer,
284 Mo. 45, 223 S.W. 655 (1920) ; Rampendahl v. Crump, 24 Okla. 873, 105 Pac.
201 (1909).
8. A petition alleging fraud and irregularities so gross as to make it evident
that the electors did not have an opportunity to express freely their will would
state a cause of action for annulment of the entire election, even though petitioner
might not be abld to prove that he would have been nominated but for such frauds
and irregularities. Lewis v. Democratic Executive Committee, 232 La. 732, 95
So.2d 292 (1957).
In an action to contest an election, the contestant has the right to demand
that specific votes be voided, and, in the alternative, that in the event the court
finds that the fraud complained of is such that voters were deprived of expression
of their will, the primary be declared null and the holding of another contest be
ordered. State ex rel. Burg v. Folse, 17 So.2d 32 (La. App. 1944).
9. Secrecy of ballot was not violated to an extent requiring votes to be thrown
out where in one precinct no election booths were constructed and votes were cast
on two school desks located on either side of the election officers at a distance of
nine to twelve feet. The vote could not be seen, but clearly the voter could. Jones
v. Steele, 275 S.W. 790 (Ky. App. 1925).
10. LA. R.S. 18:326 (1950) : "The respective governing authorities, and the
commission council of the City of New Orleans, shall cause the polling places to
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law are primarily designed to insure expeditious balloting and
tabulating of results, and the failure to abide by these provisions
likewise is a deviation from the provisions of the law.1
The Louisiana Constitution in Article VIII, Section 15, states,
"The Legislature shall provide some plan by which voters may
prepare their ballots in secrecy at the polls." Louisiana Revised
Statutes 18:326 directs respective governing authorities to pro-
vide polling booths in which voters may conveniently and with
absolute secrecy mark their ballots.12 Interpretation of these
secrecy requirements has been influenced by the requirement
that a candidate in order to contest an election must allege that
but for irregularities or fraud he would have won.'8 Consequent-
ly, the Louisiana courts have consistently refused to consider the
validity of contested votes where the number of votes challenged
was insufficient to alter the results. 1 4 However, when violations
of election laws were so widespread as to constitute a substan-
tial departure from the law that the court felt it impossible to
say that the will of the majority had been expressed in a free
and honest manner, the election was annulled. 15 Nevertheless,
the court of appeal in Beard v. Henry6 in upholding an election
stated, "the holding of an election without facilities required by
law to afford the electors opportunity to prepare their ballots
be provided with voting shelves and compartments, known as polling booths, in
which voters may conveniently with absolute secrecy mark their ballots. These
booths shall be similar in character to those required to be used in general elec-
tions."
11. Id. 18:299-305 (establishing date and place of election) ; id. 18:321 (sam-
ple ballots) ; id. 18:691 (cards of instruction) ; id. 18:1165 (mandatory use of
voting machines in municipal corporation of more than one hundred and fifty
thousand persons).
12. Id. 18:326.
13. Id. 18:364; Landry v. Ozenne, 194 La. 853, 195 So. 14 (1940) ; Livaudais
v. Leovy, 193 So. 613 (La. App. 1940) ; Crooks v. Chevallier, 156 So. 586 (La.
App. 1934).
14. Alleged violation of secrecy involving forty-eight votes did not state a cause
of action where disallowing these votes would not change the results of the elec-
tion. Duncan v. Vernon Parish School Board, 226 La. 379, 76 So.2d 403 (1954).
See also Womach v. Nettles, 155 La. 359, 99 So. 290 (1924) ; Andrews v. Black-
man, 131 La. 355, 59 So. 769 (1912).
15. Failure to use ballots bearing detachable numbered slips as provided by law
vitiated each vote cast upon such a ballot. The court stated: "The purpose of
these provisions is to make effective one of the main objects of the Primary Elec-
tion Law, and that is that the voter shall be permitted to cast his ballot secretly,
without the possibility of any one else knowing how he voted; the idea being that,
in these circumstances, he would come nearer voting his true convictions." Hart
v. Picou, 147 La. 1017, 1021, 86 So. 479, 480 (1920). An election conducted with-
out booths and with someone other than the voter writing on each ballot and with
numerous other irregularities was declared to be in contravention of the law and
therefore a nullity. Williams Cypress Co. v. Police Jury St. Martin Parish, 129
La. 267, 55 So. 878 (1911).
16. 199 So. 468 (La. App. 1940).
in secrecy is an irregularity only."'17 It should be noted, however,
that the plaintiff did not attack the election on the grounds that
it was not conducted in substantial compliance with the law and
that it therefore failed to register the free will of the electorate.
Under this theory the proper remedy to be sought would be the
invalidation of the election, not a judgment altering the results
so that plaintiff would win.
In the instant case the plaintiff's primary contention 18 was
that certain specified votes should be voided because secrecy was
lacking when they were cast. Since the court felt that the evi-
dence introduced did not overcome the presumption favoring
validity of the votes, her contention was rejected. Violation of
secrecy in a few votes with the possibility of violation in other
votes was not sufficient to maintain the plaintiff's primary con-
tention. The facts of the case serve to focus attention upon the
question of what would be sufficient proof to overcome the pre-
sumption of validity and thus have the votes voided for lack of
secrecy. Which of the following set of circumstances must a con-
testant prove in order to be successful: (1) That each contested
vote was observed by someone, the voter realized his vote was
being observed, and that he therefore altered his vote; (2) that
each contested vote was observed by someone, and the voter real-
ized his vote was being observed; (3) that each contested vote
was observed by someone; (4) that a systematic surveillance
was conducted from a position so located that the observer could
see a vote cast and therefore he probably saw the contested vote
cast; (5) that occasional surveillance of votes occurred from a
position so located that the observer could see a vote cast; (6)
that conditions existed so that systematic surveillance could have
occurred; or (7) that conditions existed so that occasional sur-
veillance could have occurred? In the instant case proof did not
establish that someone was on the stairway throughout the elec-
tion and therefore did not establish conditions which permitted
systematic surveillance. The court merely held that existence of
conditions which permit occasional surveillance without more
will not justify the voiding of a contested vote. However, in
Beard v. Henry the court sustained defendant's plea of no cause
of action where the plaintiff alleged systematic surveillance and
17. Id. at 471.
18. Although plaintiff alleged other irregularities and attacked her opponent's
qualifications for failure to pay membership dues to the Louisiana State Bar Asso-
ciation, this note is limited to a consideration of alleged violation of secrecy re-
quirements.
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conditions which allowed observers to see votes cast. On the
basis of the Beard case the proof must exceed that of category
four above.' 9 The sufficiency of proof in such a case has not yet
been ruled on by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
In the alternative plaintiff contended that the election was
conducted in a manner which did not substantially comply with
the law and thus failed to represent fairly the free will of the
majority. In denying the remedy sought, that of annulling the
election, the court followed the rule stated in Duncan v. Vernon
Parish School Board,20 viz., the "court will set aside an election
when it is convinced that an injustice has been done due to gross
irregularities in the conduct of an election."121 However, it would
seem that this rule does not supply litigants with an adequate
appreciation of what is required of them in order to contest suc-
cessfully an election in which secrecy has been violated. A con-
sideration of the seven factual situations previously discussed
may supply an insight into the actual proof required to attack
the validity of an entire election. In Hart v. Picou,22 the court
annulled an election where a possibility of surveillance of all the
ballots was shown, although no actual surveillance was proven.
Apparently the proof need not meet the requirements of the first
five situations. The instant case establishes that an election will
not be annulled under situation seven, that is, where conditions
existed so that occasional surveillance could have occurred. On
the basis of the few reported cases in which the remedy of an-
nulling the election was sought because of a violation of secrecy,
it would seem that the proof must establish that conditions
existed which permitted systematic surveillance so that the vote
and the identity of the voter could actually be determined. When
this remedy of annulling the election is sought it must also be
proven that the violation of secrecy pertained to sufficient votes
to alter the result of the election.
In an election contest the balancing of public interest may be
more effectively achieved by considering each secrecy contest in
relation to the remedy sought.2 3 If the validity of specific votes
19. Beard v. Henry, 199 So. 468 (La. App. 1940). The court stated that since
plaintiff did not allege that he had been deprived of a single vote, the votes were
deemed valid. Apparently this court considered it necessary to establish that be-
cause of the lack of secrecy a vote is altered, or else the vote will not be voided.
This lends support to the rule of category one in the text.
20. 226 La. 379, 76 So.2d 403 (1954).
21. Id. at 385, 76 So.2d at 405.
22. 147 La. 1017, 86 So. 479 (1920).
23. Even though a violation of an election law has been established, the court
[Vol. XXI
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is attacked by a candidate seeking to have himself adjudged
winner of an election, it is likely that courts will require exacting
proof of injury to the plaintiff before granting the remedy
sought. If the contest seeks to protect the public's right to an
election which represents the free will of the majority and the
remedy sought is that of annulling the election, the court will
probably continue to require less exacting proof of secrecy vio-
lations in order to sustain a judgment annulling the election.
Thus the public has a right to a secret election, but plaintiff does
not have a right to be declared winner of an election because his
opponent received more non-secret votes than plaintiff received.
Sydney B. Nelson
ESTATE TAX - BuY-SELL AGREEMENTS
A family partnership agreement provided that upon the with-
drawal of any partner the remaining partners had the option to
purchase his interest at two-thirds of "net value."' Failure to
exercise this option within twelve months automatically dis-
solved the partnership. The agreement also provided that upon
the death of a partner, the remaining partners had the option
to purchase the interest of the decedent for its full "net value."
Following the death of two partners, estate tax returns were
filed. The partnership interest of each was included in the re-
spective estates at two-thirds of its "net value." The Commis-
sioner assessed a deficiency, basing his valuation upon the full
value of each partner's interest in the total net assets of the firm.
The deficiency was paid. On suit for a refund, held, allowed.
The value of the interest for estate tax purposes cannot exceed
the value of those interests during the lifetime of the deceased
partners. Land v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Ala.
1960) .2
may determine that a more appropriate remedy may be punishment of those who
violated the law rather than annulling the election. Support for the remedy of
punishing violators is found in the numerous statutes which provide penalties for
violation of election laws, some of which are the following: LA. R.S. 18:73, 94,
131, 222, 223, 341, 352, 363, 367, 368, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378,
379, 380, 560, 562, 563, 565, 566, 570, 587, 588, 589, 634, 733, 735, 736, 737, 738,
1079, 1111, 1194, 1484, 1486 (1950).
1. Land v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Ala. 1960) (the net value
of a partnership interest was to be determined by valuing the assets of the part-
nership either by agreement among the partners, in accordance with accepted
accounting procedures, or, if necessary, through arbitration).
2. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, CCH U.S.T.C. "Court of Appeals Dockets,"
May 5, 1961.
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